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10 
AGORA: REFLECTIONS ON ZIVOTOFSKY V. KERRY 
ZIVOTOFSKY II’S TWO VISIONS FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
Harlan Grant Cohen* 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of  the Supreme Court's decision in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II),1 was the 
open disagreement between Justice Kennedy and Chief  Justice Roberts. What Justice Kennedy’s majority opin-
ion, holding that the President has exclusive power to recognize states and governments and that Congress 
cannot constitutionally impinge on that power by requiring the President to list Israel in the passports of  U.S. 
citizens born in Jerusalem, means for future foreign relations law cases is something of  a puzzle. Solving it 
requires understanding the two competing visions at the case’s center and the fluctuating relationship between 
the two Justices who hold them.   
I. The Roberts-Kennedy Foreign Relations Law Fulcrum 
Justice Kennedy and Chief  Justice Roberts have been allies in most of  the Roberts Court’s foreign relations 
law jurisprudence. Justice Kennedy joined the Chief  Justice’s majority opinions in Medellín,2 Kiobel,3 Zivotofsky I,4 
and Bond5 and his dissent in BG Group.6 Chief  Justice Roberts joined Justices Kennedy’s majority opinion Ari-
zona v. United States.7 But there have been notable disagreements. Justice Kennedy concurred in Justice Stevens’ 
majority opinion in Hamdan.8 The Chief  Justice did not take part in the Court’s decision, but as Circuit court 
judge, authored the DC Circuit opinion that the Court overruled. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion 
in Boumediene9 with the Chief  Justice writing a vociferous dissent.10 And even as he joined the Chief  Justice’s 
majority opinion in Kiobel,11 Justice Kennedy added a concurrence in many ways at odds with the majority’s 
logic.12  
 
* Associate Professor of  Law at the University of  Georgia School of  Law. Thank you to Pamela Bookman, Rebecca Ingber, Shalev Roisman, and Carlos 
Vázquez. 
Originally published online 20 July 2015. 
1 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S.Ct. 2076 (2015) [hereinafter Zivotofsky II]. 
2 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
3 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). 
4 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421 (2012). 
5 Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077 (2014). 
6 BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of  Arg., 134 S.Ct. 1198 (2014). 
7 Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012). 
8 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557(2006). 
9 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008). 
10 Id. at 2278-2293 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
11 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1659. 
12 Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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These moments of  disagreement are revealing. As I have explained elsewhere,13 the dominant trend in Rob-
ert’s Court foreign relations law jurisprudence has been a shift from functionalist approaches and rhetoric 
toward formalist ones. Whereas the Court has in the past used functionalist logic to empower the political 
branches in foreign relations, the Roberts Court has been methodically reining them in, using the rhetoric of  
formalism to subject foreign relations to judicial scrutiny by narrowing the political question doctrine in Zivo-
tofsky I14 and to tie the political branches to clear statutory and constitutional authorizations, denying the 
President authority to order Texas to comply with the decision of  the International Court of  Justice in Medellín 
in the absence of  specific Congressional action,15 and using presumptions in Morrison,16 Kiobel,17 and Bond18 to 
narrow discretion in the absence of  clear Congressional mandates. Chief  Justice Roberts has been at the fore-
front of  this trend, authoring many of  the Court’s signature formalist opinions.   
Justice Kennedy’s opinions do not join this trend from functionalism to formalism. Boumediene took a highly 
functionalist, pragmatic approach to both the history and purpose of  habeas corpus and to its application to 
specific situations.19 In this regard, Boumediene is an heir to Justice Kennedy’s pre-Roberts Court concurrences 
on Rasul v. Bush20 and Verdugo-Urquidez,21 in which he borrowed Justice Harlan’s pragmatic “what process is 
due”22 approach to constitutional rights. Chief  Justice Roberts, in dissent in Boumediene, condemned the unpre-
dictable nature of  Justice Kennedy’s multi-factor analysis.23 In Arizona, Justice Kennedy adopted a functionalist 
view of  immigration and preemption. Noting the serious foreign policy implications of  immigration law and 
enforcement, Justice Kennedy was quick to preempt state laws that might undermine Congress’ and the Presi-
dent’s carefully balanced immigration policies.24 And in Kiobel, concurring in Chief  Justice Roberts majority 
opinion, Justice Kennedy struck a blow for pragmatism, emphasizing that “[t]he opinion for the Court is careful 
to leave open a number of  significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of  the Alien Tort Stat-
ute.”25 
II. Formalism and Functionalism in Zivotofsky II 
This fissure is powerfully evident in Zivotofsky II. For Justice Kennedy, the President’s exclusive power to 
recognize states and governments is a practical function of  constitutional structure. All means of  recognition—
receiving an ambassador, negotiating a treaty, sending an ambassador, or opening diplomatic channels—are 
“dependent on Presidential power.” Beyond that, “the Nation must have a single policy regarding which gov-
ernments are legitimate in the eyes of  the United States.” “[T]he Nation must ‘speak with one voice,’” and the 
President is better situated to take “decisive, unequivocal action” and to engage “in delicate and often secret 
 
13 Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380 (2015). 
14 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421 (2012). 
15 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 529–30. 
16 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). 
17 Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1664. 
18 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2091. 
19 Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2276-2277. 
20 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485–88 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
21 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990). 
22 Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)). 
23 Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2293 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
24 Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2492. 
25 Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1659 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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diplomatic contacts.”26 Justice Kennedy wrote of  “logical and proper inference,”27 of  “functional considera-
tions,”28 and of  “common sense and necessity.”29 Even as he buries Justice Sutherland’s famous functionalist 
pro-President dicta in Curtiss-Wright,30 Justice Kennedy revealed himself  Sutherland’s true heir, embracing the 
logic and tropes that defined Sutherland-authored opinions in Curtiss-Wright31 and Belmont.32 
This functionalism extends too to Justice Kennedy’s use of  history.33 Much as in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy 
found the historical practice to be complicated and contestable.34 Adopting a holistic and functional approach 
though, he concluded that “on balance [the history] provides strong support for the conclusion that the recog-
nition power is the President’s alone.”35 Justice Kennedy’s approach stands in contrast to the stricter requirement 
that a practice be “‘open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of  the Republic’” endorsed by 
Justice Thomas.36  
None of  this analysis passed muster with the more formalist Chief  Justice. Dissenting, Chief  Justice Roberts 
takes a more formalist, textualist view of  the Reception clause of  the U.S. Constitution. For him, the clause 
creates a Presidential duty to receive ambassadors rather than a Presidential power.37 And neither the precedents 
nor the history discussed by Justice Kennedy would have met Chief  Justice Roberts’ stricter standards for the 
use of  either.38  
But at the heart of  the disagreement between Justice Kennedy and Chief  Justice Roberts are their competing 
approaches to Justice Jackson’s famous Youngstown concurrence39 and its tripartite analysis of  separation of  
powers questions. Justice Kennedy read the framework as a flexible one. Because the President is, in this case, 
acting contrary to a clear statutory mandate, “his claim must be ‘scrutinized with caution.’”40 That said, Justice 
Jackson left some room for the President to act even in that third category, and as Justice Kennedy noted, 
“when a Presidential power is ‘exclusive,’” as Justice Kennedy found the recognition power to be in this case, 
“it ‘disabl[es] the Congress from acting upon the subject.’”41  
Chief  Justice Roberts read Justice Jackson’s framework much more strictly. Quoting from Justice Jackson’s 
Youngstown concurrence, the Chief  Justice observed that “[a]ssertions of  exclusive and preclusive power leave 
the Executive ‘in the least favorable of  possible postures,’ and such claims have been scrutinized with caution 
throughout this Court’s history.” Noting that “[f]or our first 225 years, no President prevailed when contradict-
ing a statute in the field of  foreign affairs,”42 Chief  Justice Roberts suggested that the category of  exclusive 
 
26 Zivotofsky II, 135 S.Ct. at 2085-86.  
27 Id. at 8. 
28 Id. at 9 
29 Id. at 18. 
30 See infra note 52-54 and accompanying text.  
31 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
32 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
33 See Curtis A. Bradley, Historical Gloss, the Recognition Power, and Judicial Review, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 2 (2015). 
34 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2249. 
35 Zivotofsky II, 135 S.Ct. at 2091.   
36 Id. at 2102 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). 
37 Id. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
38 Id. at 2114 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
39 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring). 
40 Zivotofsky II, 138 S.Ct. at 2113. 
41 Id. at 2095 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 637–638 (Jackson, J., concurring)).  
42 Id. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
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Presidential powers that would allow the President to disregard a contrary congressional act may be an empty 
set.      
The Chief  Justice thus makes explicit a project only implied by his earlier treatment of  Youngstown in Medellín. 
That opinion seemed to narrow and formalize Youngstown’s categories, making Presidential action conflicting 
with Congress’ prior acts—the third category—essentially forbidden.43 This followed Justice Stevens’ similar 
treatment of  Youngstown’s third category in Hamdan.44 The Chief  Justice cites the rejection of  Executive actions 
in both those cases as support for his approach here.45  
This shines new light on the Roberts-Kennedy foreign relations law fulcrum. Whereas Justice Kennedy has 
been the Court’s supreme functionalist, Chief  Justice Roberts has often seemed a less-than-committed formal-
ist. While opinions in Medellín, Kiobel, and Bond all partake of  formalist rhetoric, they each have functionalist 
elements—a functional understanding of  the United States’ intentions in ratifying the UN Charter, a functional 
touch-and-concern test for jurisdiction in Alien Tort Statute cases, or a functional approach to the meaning of  
“chemical weapons.” In Zivotofsky II, he writes in more uncompromisingly formalist terms. Were the Chief  
Justice’s prior functionalist flourishes the price of  Kennedy’s vote? Whether the earlier patterns of  compromise 
between Justice Kennedy and Chief  Justice Roberts on such matters were conscious or unconscious, and 
whether or not they were attempted in drafts in this case, will only be known when archives are opened. 
III. Here be Dragons 
Justice Kennedy and Chief  Justice Roberts both believe that foreign relations present existential dangers for 
the United States. The two justices disagree fundamentally though on that danger’s primary source. 
For Justice Kennedy, the primary source of  danger is external. Foreign relations are complex, and perils for 
the United States abound abroad. He began his opinion in Zivotofsky II by noting the delicacy of  questions about 
Jerusalem’s status. “Jerusalem’s political standing has long been, and remains, one of  the most sensitive issues 
in American foreign policy, and indeed it is one of  the most delicate issues in current international affairs.”46 
He later cited a letter from then-Secretary of  State Warren Christopher observing that “[t]here is no issue 
related to the Arab-Israeli negotiations that is more sensitive than Jerusalem.”47 Such sensitive issues, in turn, 
require the Court to take a pragmatic approach to foreign relations law and Presidential authority. In this sense, 
his majority opinion in Zivotofsky II reads much like his opinion in Arizona, which began by citing a former U.S. 
Secretary of  State’s views that immigration policy carried complex foreign relations implications that justified 
authority and discretion in the political branches.48 And it reads like his Kiobel concurrence, pleading for flexi-
bility in dealing with foreign relations cases.49 
Boumediene might seem at odds with this outlook, using functionalist reasoning to restrain Congress and the 
President. In fact though, it may be the flipside of  the same coin as Zivotofsky II. If  the Executive is constrained 
only by functional considerations, the Executive is, at least practically, empowered to find those limits. Justice 
Kennedy’s Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence, using the same logic as Boumediene to approve the President’s actions, 
demonstrates as much. And that is how lower courts have read it, finding few cases that meet Boumediene’s 
standard for heightened scrutiny.   
 
43 See Cohen, supra note 13, at 422-23. 
44 Id. at 418. 
45 Zivotofsky II, 138 S.Ct. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
46 Zivotofsky II, 132 S.Ct. at 2085. 
47 Id. (quoting 141 Cong. Rec. 28967 (1995) (letter to Robert Dole, Majority Leader, (June 20, 1995)).  
48 Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2498 (relying on brief  from former Secretary of  State Madeleine K. Albright). 
49 Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1659 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
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For Justice Kennedy, there are dangers abroad, and the President must be authorized to defend the nation. 
Justice Scalia describes Justice Thomas’ approach in concurrence as an endorsement of  a presidency more 
reminiscent of  George III than George Washington.50 Justice Kennedy’s President is more St. George, tasked 
with defending the realm from foreign dragons. 
For Chief  Justice Roberts, while external threats can pose grave dangers, the real risk is not foreign dragons 
but a Leviathan: a federal government, and in particular an Executive, that uses foreign danger as an excuse to 
engorge its power at home and to engage in reckless adventurism abroad. Federal foreign relations power must 
be restrained. A stricter Youngstown test that leaves less room for Executive branch aggrandizement and con-
gressional silence, a stricter political question doctrine that leaves fewer acts beyond judicial scrutiny, stricter 
rules of  statutory interpretation that require greater precision from Congress and leave less room for prosecu-
torial discretion and judicial foreign policy—these are the key moves in Chief  Justice Roberts’ foreign relations 
law jurisprudence. 
IV. A Return to Foreign Affairs Functionalism and Exceptionalism? 
Assuming the Court has been moving away from functionalist approaches to foreign relations law that had 
long made the area “exceptional,”51 embracing formalist tools to rein in the broad discretion long-wielded by 
the political branches, does Zivotofsky II, Justice Kennedy’s break with the Chief  Justice, and Justice Kennedy’s 
ability to gather a majority around his functionalist opinion auger a change in the Court’s direction? The last 
two Justice Kennedy functionalist interventions, Boumediene and Arizona did little to stop the rushing path to-
wards formalism and constraint in foreign relations law.    
Moreover, Zivotofky II is not without formalist flourishes. Justice Kennedy tried to narrow the decision “solely 
to exclusive power of  the President to control recognition determinations” and congressional attempts to force 
the President to contradict his own statements. 52 More notably, the majority distinguished their holding from 
the Government’s argument that “the President has ‘exclusive authority to conduct diplomatic relations,’ along 
with ‘the bulk of  foreign-affairs,’”53 and formally disavowed the common use of Curtiss-Wright’s dicta recogniz-
ing the President as “the sole organ of  the federal government in the field of  international relations,” as a 
source of  “broad, undefined [Presidential] powers over foreign affairs.” 54 Together, the narrowing of  the opin-
ion and the disavowal of  Curtiss-Wright might suggest that the rest of  the majority has not entirely lost its 
appetite for formalism and constraint. Those caveats may have been the price of  their votes. 
Zivotofsky II also presents a somewhat unique case for the Roberts Court, one in which the President and 
Congress were truly at odds. This Court seems as interested in reining in Congress as the Executive,55 and it is 
clear that for the majority, Congress’s attempt to make policy with regard to Jerusalem was an “improper act” 
to “‘aggrandiz[e] its power at the expense of  another branch.’”56 And the substantive outcome of  this case also 
likely mattered. Justice Kennedy and the four justices who joined his opinion likely believe that Jerusalem’s 
status is a sensitive foreign policy question best left to the President. If  they did not, they could have joined 
 
50 Zivotofsky II, 132 S.Ct. at 2109 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
51 Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of  Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015). 
52 Zivotofsky II, 132 S.Ct. at 2099. 
53 Id. at 2089 (quoting Brief  for Respondent at 18, 16). 
54 Id. 
55 Cohen, supra note 13, at 441 n.426 and passim.  
56 Zivotofsky II, 132 S.Ct. at 2096 (internal citation omitted). One might wonder whether Congressional conflicts with the Executive 
then in the news, like Speaker of  the House John Boehner’s invitation to Israel Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to address Congress 
or Senator Tom Cotton’s letter to Iran, were on the majority’s mind when they considered whether Congress needed to be reined in.  
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Justice Scalia’s dissent, which laid out a narrow route to deciding the case—a narrow route to a loss for the 
President. Zivotofsky II might not tell us very much about cases not about Jerusalem.57 
Nonetheless, the logic of  Zivotofsky II is certainly at odds with trends toward formalism, constraint, or nor-
malization. The majority in Zivotofsky II largely undoes Justice Stevens’ and Chief  Justice Roberts’ efforts to 
narrow and formalize Justice Jackson’s three Youngstown categories, reopening the possibility that even when 
Congress speaks, the President may disregard it. Moreover, the logic of  the opinion, including its invocation of  
the need for “one voice” in foreign relations, is extraordinarily broad. Regardless of  what the majority believes, 
the boundaries of  that logic are hard to discern. For example, the same functional arguments made by Justice 
Kennedy in favor of  an exclusive recognition power could be made in favor of  an exclusive Commander-in-
Chief  power: regardless of  the range of  congressional powers with regard to the military and war-making, the 
President is necessary to bring them into effect. Can congressional attempts to regulate war-fighting, perhaps 
by imposing time-limits, bans on tactics or weapons, or prohibitions on ground-troops simply be ignored by 
Presidents?58   
The majority may think it knows the answer and that its decision in Zivotofsky II truly is narrow. But policing 
that unspoken boundary depends on the Court reviewing these cases, something it is unlikely to do. As Jack 
Goldsmith suggests,59 the real concern might be how the Government itself  will read this opinion, and while 
the Office of  Legal Counsel may mourn the death of Curtiss-Wright, the mourning period will be short, and the 
Executive Branch may move on quickly to Zivotofsky II and arguments about exclusive powers and one voice.   
The other question Zivotofsky II raises for prevailing trends regards future grants of  certiorari. For those who 
voted to grant certiorari in cases like Bond and Zivotofsky on the hopes that the time was right to reconsider 
broad functionalist doctrines with regard to treaties or the recognition power, those efforts may now appear to 
have been turned back twice (maybe three times if  one counts the doors left open in Kiobel). If  a Justice is 
worried that other cases will turn out like Bond and Zivotofsky, the appetite for revisiting such cases may disap-
pear. Without grants of  certiorari, Zivotofsky II’s legacy will be left to lower courts. It is easy to imagine lower 
courts invoking Zivotofsky II as an all-purpose justification for functionalist foreign relations deference to the 
Executive much as they invoked the political question doctrine before Zivotofsky I. 
 
57 Commitment to a substantive outcome, in that case, granting Guantanamo detainees access to habeas review, might explain the 
majority’s decision to join Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Boumediene.   
58 Notably, Chief  Justice Roberts in dissent cites Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804), a case suggesting that the President is required to 
abide by congressional limits on war-making.   
59 Jack Goldsmith, Why Zivotofsky Is a Significant Victory for the Executive Branch, LAWFARE, (June 8, 2015, 3:44 PM). 
